Shareholder information
Dual listed companies structure
In 1995, Rio Tinto shareholders approved the terms of the dual listed companies merger (the DLC merger) which was designed to place the shareholders of both Companies in substantially the same position as if they held shares in a single enterprise owning all of the assets of both Companies. As a condition of its approval of the DLC merger, the Australian Government required Rio Tinto plc to reduce its shareholding in Rio Tinto Limited to 39 per cent by the end of 2005. Consistent with the commitments made to the Australian Government in 1995, the Rio Tinto plc shareholding in Rio Tinto Limited has been reduced over time and it now stands at approximately 37.5 per cent.
Following the approval of the DLC merger, both Companies entered into a DLC Merger Sharing Agreement (the Sharing Agreement) through which each Company agreed to ensure that the businesses of Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited are managed on a unified basis, to ensure that the boards of directors of each Company is the same, and to give effect to certain arrangements designed to provide shareholders of each Company with a common economic interest in the combined enterprise.
In order to achieve this third objective, the Sharing Agreement provided for the ratio of dividend, voting and capital distribution rights attached to each Rio Tinto plc share and to each Rio Tinto Limited share to be fixed in an Equalisation Ratio which has remained unchanged at 1:1. The Sharing Agreement has provided for this ratio to be revised in special circumstances where, for example, certain modifications are made to the share capital of one Company, such as rights issues, bonus issues, share splits and share consolidations, but not to the share capital of the other. Outside these specified circumstances, the Equalisation Ratio can only be altered with the approval of shareholders under the Class Rights Action approval procedure described under Voting rights. In addition, any adjustments are required to be confirmed by the auditors.
One consequence of the DLC merger is that Rio Tinto is subject to a wide range of laws, rules and regulatory review across multiple jurisdictions. Where these rules differ Rio Tinto, as a Group, aims to comply with the strictest applicable level.
Consistent with the creation of a single combined enterprise under the DLC merger, directors of each Company act in the best interests of Rio Tinto as a whole. When matters may involve a conflict of interests between the shareholders of each Company they must be approved under the Class Rights Action approval procedure.
To ensure that the boards of both Companies are identical, resolutions to appoint or remove directors must be put to shareholders of both as a joint electorate as Joint Decisions as described under Voting rights, and it is a requirement that a person can only be a director of one Company if that person is also a director of the other Company. So, for example, if a person was removed as a director of Rio Tinto plc, he or she would also cease to be a director of Rio Tinto Limited.
Dividend rights
The Sharing Agreement provides for dividends paid on Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited shares to be equalised on a net cash basis, that is without taking into account any associated tax credits. Dividends are determined in US dollars and are then, except for ADR holders, translated and paid in sterling and Australian dollars. The Companies are also required to announce and pay their dividends and other distributions as close in time to each other as possible.
In the unlikely event that one Company did not have sufficient distributable reserves to pay the equalised dividend or the equalised capital distribution, it would be entitled to receive a top up payment from the other Company. The top up payment could be made as a dividend on the DLC Dividend Share, or by way of a contractual payment.
If the payment of an equalised dividend would contravene the law applicable to one of the Companies, then they may depart from the Equalisation Ratio. However, should such a departure occur, then the relevant Company will put aside reserves to be held for payment on the relevant shares at a later date.
Rio Tinto shareholders have no direct rights to enforce the dividend equalisation provisions of the Sharing Agreement.
The DLC Dividend Share can also be utilised to provide the Group with flexibility for internal funds management by allowing dividends to be paid between the two parts of the Group. Such dividend payments are of no economic significance to the shareholders of either Company, as they will have no effect on the Group's overall resources.
Voting rights
In principle, the Sharing Agreement provides for the public shareholders of Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited to vote as a joint electorate on all matters which affect shareholders of both Companies in similar ways. These are referred to as Joint Decisions. Such Joint Decisions include the creation of new classes of share capital, the appointment or removal of directors and auditors and the receiving of annual financial statements. Joint Decisions are voted on a poll.
The Sharing Agreement also provides for the protection of the public shareholders of each Company by treating the shares issued by each Company as if they were separate classes of shares issued by a single company. So decisions that do not affect the shareholders of both Companies equally require the separate approval of the shareholders of both Companies. Matters requiring this approval procedure are referred to as Class Rights Actions and are voted on a poll.
Thus, the interests of the shareholders of each Company are protected against decisions which affect them and the shareholders in the other Company differently, by requiring their separate approval. For example, fundamental elements of the DLC merger cannot be changed unless approved by shareholders under the Class Rights Action approval procedure.
Exceptions to these principles can arise in situations such as where legislation requires the separate approval of a decision by the appropriate majority of shareholders in one Company and where approval of the matter by shareholders of the other Company is not required.
Where a matter has been expressly categorised as either a Joint Decision or a Class Rights Action, the directors do not have the power to change that categorisation. If a matter falls within both categories, it is treated as a Class Rights Action. In addition, the directors can determine that matters not expressly listed in either category should be put to shareholders for their approval under either procedure.
To facilitate the joint voting arrangements each Company has entered into shareholder voting agreements. Each Company has issued a Special Voting Share to a special purpose company held in trust by a common Trustee.
Rio Tinto plc has issued its Special Voting Share (RTP Special Voting Share) to RTL Shareholder SVC and Rio Tinto Limited has issued its Special Voting Share (RTL Special Voting Share) to RTP Shareholder SVC. The total number of votes cast on Joint Decisions by the public shareholders of one Company are voted at the parallel meeting of the other Company. The role of these special purpose companies in achieving this is described below.
In exceptional circumstances, certain public shareholders of the Companies can be excluded from voting at the respective Company's general meetings because they have acquired shares in one Company in excess of a given threshold without making an offer for all the shares in the other Company. If this should occur, the votes cast by these excluded shareholders will be disregarded.
Following the Companies' general meetings the overall results of the voting on Joint Decisions and the results of voting on separate decisions will be announced to the stock exchanges, published on the Rio Tinto website and advertised in the Financial Times and The Australian newspapers.
Rio Tinto plc
At a Rio Tinto plc shareholders' meeting at which a Joint Decision will be considered, each Rio Tinto plc share will carry one vote and the holder of its Special Voting Share will have one vote for each vote cast by the public shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited. The holder of the Special Voting Share is required to vote strictly and only in accordance with the votes cast by public shareholders for and against the equivalent resolution at the parallel Rio Tinto Limited shareholders' meeting.
The holders of Rio Tinto Limited ordinary shares do not actually hold any voting shares in Rio Tinto plc by virtue of their holding in Rio Tinto Limited and cannot enforce the voting arrangements relating to the Special Voting Share.
Rio Tinto Limited
At a Rio Tinto Limited shareholders' meeting at which a Joint Decision will be considered, each Rio Tinto Limited share will carry one vote and, together with the Rio Tinto Limited ordinary shares held by Tinto Holdings Australia, the holder of its Special Voting Share will carry one vote for each vote cast by the public shareholders of Rio Tinto plc in their parallel meeting. Tinto Holdings Australia and the holder of the Special Voting Share are required to vote strictly, and only, in accordance with the votes cast for and against the equivalent resolution at the parallel Rio Tinto plc shareholders' meeting.
The holders of Rio Tinto plc ordinary shares do not actually hold any voting shares in Rio Tinto Limited by virtue of their holding in Rio Tinto plc and cannot enforce the voting arrangements relating to the Special Voting Share.
Capital distribution rights
If either of the Companies goes into liquidation, the Sharing Agreement provides for a valuation to be made of the surplus assets of both Companies. If the surplus assets available for distribution by one Company on each of the shares held by its public shareholders exceed the surplus assets available for distribution by the other Company on each of the shares held by its public shareholders, then an equalising payment between the two Companies shall be made, to the extent permitted by applicable law, such that the amount available for distribution on each share held by public shareholders of each Company conforms to the Equalisation Ratio. The objective is to ensure that the public shareholders of both Companies have equivalent rights to the assets of the combined Group on a per share basis, taking account of the Equalisation Ratio.
The Sharing Agreement does not grant any enforceable rights to the shareholders of either Company upon liquidation of a Company.
Limitations on ownership of shares and merger obligations
The laws and regulations of the UK and Australia impose restrictions and obligations on persons who control interests in public quoted companies in excess of defined thresholds that, under certain circumstances, include obligations to make a public offer for all of the outstanding issued shares of the relevant company. The threshold applicable to Rio Tinto plc under UK law and regulations is 30 per cent and to Rio Tinto Limited under Australian law and regulations is 20 per cent.
As part of the DLC merger, the memorandum and articles of association of Rio Tinto plc and the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited were amended with the intention of extending these laws and regulations to the combined enterprise and, in particular, to ensure that a person cannot exercise control over one Company without having made offers to the public shareholders of both Companies. It is consistent with the creation of the single economic enterprise and the equal treatment of the two sets of shareholders, that these laws and regulations should operate in this way. The articles of association of Rio Tinto plc and the constitution of Rio Tinto Limited impose restrictions on any person who controls, directly or indirectly, 20 per cent or more of the votes on a Joint Decision. If, however, such a person only has an interest in either Rio Tinto Limited or Rio Tinto plc, then the restrictions will only apply if they control, directly or indirectly, 30 per cent or more of the votes at that Company's general meetings.
If one of the thresholds specified above is breached then, subject to certain limited exceptions and notification by the relevant Company, such persons may not attend or vote at general meetings of the relevant Company, may not receive dividends or other distributions from the relevant Company, and may be divested of their interest by the directors of the relevant Company. These restrictions will continue to apply until such persons have either made a public offer for all of the publicly held shares of the other Company, or have reduced their controlling interest below the thresholds specified, or have acquired through a permitted means at least 50 per cent of the voting rights of all the shares held by the public shareholders of each Company.
These provisions are designed to ensure that offers for the publicly held shares of both Companies would be required to avoid the restrictions set out above, even if the interests which breach the thresholds are only held in one of the Companies. The directors do not have the discretion to exempt a person from the operation of these rules.
Under the Sharing Agreement, the Companies agree to cooperate to enforce the restrictions contained in their articles of association and constitution and also agree that no member of the Rio Tinto Group shall accept a third party offer for Rio Tinto Limited shares unless such acceptance is approved by a Joint Decision of the public shareholders of both Companies.
Guarantees
In 1995, each Company entered into a Deed Poll Guarantee in favour of creditors of the other Company. Pursuant to the Deed Poll Guarantees, each Company guaranteed the contractual obligations of the other Company and the obligations of other persons which are guaranteed by the other Company, subject to certain limited exceptions. Beneficiaries under the Deed Poll Guarantees may make demand upon the guarantor thereunder without first having recourse to the Company or persons whose obligations are being guaranteed. The obligations of the guarantor under each Deed Poll Guarantee expire upon termination of the Sharing Agreement and under other limited circumstances, but only in respect of obligations arising after such termination and, in the case of other limited circumstances, the publication and expiry of due notice. The shareholders of the Companies cannot enforce the provision of the Deed Poll Guarantees.
